

Formation of the State Policy of Re-Emigration of Ukrainians: Problems and Prospects

Alla Nadtochii (PhD in Public Administration, Associate Professor of the Department of Personnel Management and Entrepreneurship, V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, Ukraine)

Nataliia Stativka (Doctor of Public Administration, Professor, Head of the Department of Personnel management and entrepreneurship, V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, Ukraine)

*Corresponding author: Alla Nadtochii

Received: April 05, 2024

Published: May 19, 2024

Abstract. The article examines the latest large-scale phenomenon on the territory of Ukraine - mass internal and external migration of the country's citizens, caused by the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation. The number and structure of migrations of citizens abroad, in particular by level of education, are outlined, and the directions of emigration are determined. The main problems faced by compatriots abroad and in case of returning to Ukraine are highlighted. The principles on which the future policy of re-emigration and reintegration of Ukrainians should be based are given. Incentives and tools that can encourage migrants to return to the Motherland are summarized. The main problems hindering the

development of Ukraine have been identified, without solving which it is impossible to expect a mass return of citizens from abroad. The experience of the migration policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the international community, which joined in supporting this country and its citizens during the difficult times of the military conflict for the country, is presented. The main directions of the state policy of re-emigration are formulated based on the needs of returning citizens and the resolution of internal contradictions in the socio-economic development of Ukraine.

Keywords: emigration, state migration policy, re-emigration, reintegration.

Introduction. In order to develop an effective state policy for the re-emigration of Ukrainians to their homeland, with the determination of the prospects for the activity of such processes, a qualitative assessment of the consequences of the continuation of the full-scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine should first be carried out. Of particular concern is the scale of the number of Ukrainians who have become refugees, migrants, and internally displaced persons.

The state of the Ukrainian economy is characterized by the strengthening of crisis phenomena, the basic indicators of socio-economic development are decreasing: the standard of living, the level of employment, wages and social standards, housing conditions, social infrastructure, which leads to the risk of losing a part of the country's population forever or for a long time. This increases the urgency to develop and apply effective tools of the state policy of re-emigration of Ukrainians and to determine the range of possible problems in the course of implementing this policy.

The purpose of the study was to provide an expert assessment of the consequences of the large-scale emigration of the population of Ukraine in the conditions of a full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation, to propose directions for future state policy aimed at the re-emigration and reintegration of citizens.

Materials and methods. It should be noted that the adoption of the Law of Ukraine "On the Protection of the Interests of the Subjects of Reporting and Other Documents During the Period of Martial Law or State of War" dated March 3, 2022 No. 2115-IX significantly limits the possibilities of statistical assessment of the scale of economic and social losses in as a result of the impact of the war [1]. Therefore, in the research we will refer to sources of information on the open data portal (such as the Operational Data Portal), calculations of the National Bank of Ukraine, other executive authorities, and expert assessments of domestic and foreign scientists.

The paper uses the method of analogy and extrapolation to identify similar and different features in emigration and re-emigration in modern Ukraine and the former Yugoslavia; generalization - to determine the already existing developments of domestic scientists regarding the

future state policy of re-emigration and reintegration.

Results and discussion. According to the Operational Data Portal, as of December 2023, there were 5.9 million Ukrainian refugees in Europe and 403.6 thousand people outside Europe, so a total of 6.3 million people. At the same time, of the total number of Ukrainian refugees in the countries belonging to the so-called Refugee Response Plan (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia), 1.9 million people (or 30.1%) are concentrated in other neighboring countries (the Russian Federation and Belarus) – 1.2 million people (or 19.0%), in other European countries – 2.7 million people, or 42.8% (including Germany – 1.1 million people, in the United Kingdom 250 thousand people), there are 406 thousand people in countries outside Europe (Fig. 1) [2].




Fig. 1. Countries with the largest number of refugees from Ukraine registered, as of the end of 2023.

In a study conducted by the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees at the United Nations (UNHCR) in November 2023, based on data from such countries as Moldova, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, the range of problems faced by Ukrainian refugees in these countries was determined. Thus, 37% of the total number of respondents went to Ukraine for the purpose of visiting relatives who remained in Ukraine, obtaining documents and checking property.

After returning, some refugees report difficulties in connection with the suspension of social benefits. Refugees note that they face difficulties in finding stable housing due to the short-term nature of their temporary protection, which leads to the impossibility of fully realizing other rights, in particular the right to education, the impossibility of enrolling children in the schools of the host country.

About 40% of respondents were employed; 20% – unemployed; 28% performed household duties. Among unemployed refugees, the main reasons for unemployment were: language barriers (37%); did not find an opportunity to get a job (29%); the need to care for children (12%) (Table 1) [3].

The average age of refugees arriving in Germany from Ukraine is 28 years, while the average age of the population in Ukraine is 41 years. By gender, 68% of all refugees were women. The average level of education of Ukrainian refugees in Germany is significantly higher than the average level of education among the population of the country of origin and significantly higher than the population of Germany aged 20 to 70 years. Among refugees from Ukraine, 72% aged 20-70 reported that they had a higher education [4] (Fig. 2).

Table 1. Problems faced by Ukrainian refugees, possible reasons for non-return and needs of refugees

in case of return to Ukraine.

Problems faced by Ukrainian refugees in EU countries revealed during surveys	Problems faced by returnees (IDPs or from abroad)	Possible reasons for non-return of Ukrainian refugees	Needs and problems of Ukrainian refugees in case of return
Availability of medical care	Difficulties in covering basic costs	Currently, EU countries have temporary protection for Ukrainian refugees until March 04, 2025, the cancellation of which in the future does not deprive refugees from Ukraine of the right to individually apply to authorized bodies for international protection	Termination of war, security issues
Obstacles in the labor market due to lack of knowledge of the language, recognition of qualifications in the host country	Unfavorable security situation	Feeling of stability and security in the host country	Housing issues
Low provision of places for care of preschool children	Lack of opportunity to earn a living	Feeling of security, including social security; The opportunity to work hard to earn a decent life and pension in the host country	Recognition of children's education abroad
Access to the rental market and the high cost of renting an apartment	Inability to fully participate in the life of the community	Opportunities for family reunification after the end of the war in the host country (when the women and their children leave for their husbands)	Jobs with decent pay




Fig. 2. Comparison of the level of education of Ukrainian refugees in Germany with the level of education in Ukraine and Germany.

With the assistance of the International Organization for Migration, a survey is being conducted in Ukraine among persons who have returned to their usual place of residence, regardless of where they returned from - from other places in Ukraine or from abroad. As of September 2023, 4.6 million people who were forced to move as a result of the invasion returned to their usual place of residence, 47% of them returned from other regions, 25% from abroad. Among the respondents, 88% expressed their intention to permanently stay in their usual place of residence; 31% among those who returned from abroad do not rule out the possibility of going again [5, p.1]. Among the people who returned from abroad (of which there are 1.1 million), 85% returned from EU countries, 2.1 million people returned from other regions and 1.2 million - from other cities within the region. Among the respondents, 52% cited the desire to return to a normal life as the reason for their return. Among those who have returned, only 4% are considering returning, which is the lowest rate during the observation period. Among those interviewed at the checkpoints across the state border, 37% answered that they planned to stay for a long period (more than 1 month), 49% were returning to Ukraine for a short visit, and 14% were undecided. After returning, 58% of respondents named financial assistance (cash support) as their most critical need. Among the respondents, 15% of returnees determined that it is difficult for them to cover their basic needs; among IDPs, there are 27%. Among the returnees, 23% owned a house/apartment that was damaged or destroyed, among them 30% confirmed receiving assistance (including new housing, repair of existing housing, compensation and other forms of assistance) [5, p.11]. Almost 40% of returnees noted that they have no influence on decision-making in their communities, among IDPs - 54%.

Therefore, a preliminary mostly expert assessment of the scope and possible consequences for the recovery and development of the national economy allows us to single out a number of provisions and principles that should be taken into account when formulating the appropriate state policy aimed at the return of migrants to Ukraine. It should be noted that this issue is new for domestic scientists from the point of view of the need for a scientific understanding of migration trends formed as a result of the active phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war and the development of recommendations for their regulation by the means and instruments of state policy in conditions when the production of official statistics is stopped, and the possibilities of selective examinations are limited.

Domestic researchers Yurii Georgiivskyi and Olena Linnyk propose to base the new policy of reintegration and re-emigration of Ukrainians on the following main principles:

- *voluntary return of refugees to Ukraine* (the means of return should not bear any sign of coercion);
- *availability*. The return process should include full organizational support and financial support by Ukraine for the return of each refugee, including the issuance of travel documents, free transportation to the place of permanent residence in Ukraine;
- *inadmissibility of any discrimination*. Scientists predict that there will be a certain break in social ties between those who remained in Ukraine during the war and those who left. There is a high probability of social rejection, so it is necessary to implement the principle of inadmissibility of discrimination against refugees, prevention of enmity and separation;
- *personal demand of refugees*. State guarantees of decent employment and ensuring the participation of everyone in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine and on the basis of this guarantee of well-being for everyone must be combined [6, p.39].

Domestic scientist Haidutskii A.P. suggests paying attention to motivational socio-economic programs that encourage migrants to return. In general, he divides these programs into four groups:

- *the first group* includes the development of cooperation with migrants even at the stage of migrants' departure in order to ensure the legal stay of migrant workers, clarification of the labor legislation of the host country by a state consultant, introduction of the position of attaché on labor issues in the embassies of those countries where the majority of Ukrainians work; posting information about seasonal migration programs on state web resources;
- *the second group* includes mechanisms that contribute to the attraction of migrants' funds to the Motherland by launching targeted banking, insurance, mortgage, pension-saving programs and services, in particular, grant programs for the education of children of migrants in

- Ukraine, subject to partial payment;
- *the third group* is focused on attracting migrants' funds for Ukraine's development programs, for example by issuing infrastructure bonds Diaspora Bonds; through the development of joint financing programs under the "1x1", "2x1", "3x1" schemes at the local level, at the level of territorial communities, social projects with sister cities from developed countries;
- *the fourth group* includes mechanisms for promoting the attraction of migrants' funds for the development of their own business, entrepreneurship and business projects, including by organizing public and private events for migrants, consultations on investment opportunities and opening their own business based on the example of already successful cases in Ukraine. In this direction, it is important to introduce tax holidays, customs benefits for importing equipment for opening one's own business [7, p.24-25].

We must emphasize the partial effectiveness of the specified motivational socio-economic programs for stimulating the return of migrants, if the needs of the migrants themselves, and even more so the problems they are facing today, are not taken into account. Emphasis only on the economic usefulness of migrants for Ukraine will significantly limit the effectiveness of policy reintegration measures (Table 1).

It is known that only 4% of the population has an entrepreneurial streak, so it is futile to hope that all migrants will save 10% of their income each month and that we will receive significant investments in the form of migrants opening their own businesses.

The authorities and the people of Ukraine need to make a lot of efforts to overcome internal problems that stand in the way of socio-economic development. It is known that the indicator of the index of economic freedom is a qualitative marker of the prospects of global competitiveness and socio-economic development of the national economy. Unfortunately, in 2023, Ukraine was only in 130th place, which makes us one of the "mostly unfree" countries [8].

The limitation of economic freedom automatically creates barriers to the inflow of investments, which hinders access to advanced technologies and affects the reduced competitiveness of business entities. The decline in the productivity of the national economy directly affects the decline in the welfare of the population according to the "productivity trap" model, and such a situation cannot contribute to the intentions of migrants to return to their homeland.

We believe that the most important incentive for the return of migrants is the economic growth of the country, which requires starting conditions – an attractive business environment, activity of investment flows, protection of property and security. The formation of the country's investment attractiveness is the primary task of the government for post-war recovery. The direct advantages and strengths of the national economy of Ukraine include a high level of education of the population, a high level of digitalization, the availability of affordable medicine, an accessible network of preschools and educational institutions. The negative ones include the shadow sector, corruption, lack of property rights, and low social standards.

If an attractive investment climate is created and threats are eliminated, all investment flows, including domestic and migrant flows, can be expected to increase. The development of the real sector of the economy will be accompanied by an increase in the demand for labor, increasing its value as a factor of production. The growth of labor income will increase the purchasing power of the population, increase the capacity of the domestic market, the level of well-being and the growth of GDP.

Economic freedom is formed in conditions of access to financial resources, which means access to advanced technologies, access to a quality infrastructure network, better fiscal conditions for startups, guarantees of non-application of corrupt practices, and most importantly, trust in the authorities.

Manifestations of public distrust of the authorities and their promises are:

- *a large shadow sector of the economy and shadow employment*, when people rely on themselves to solve their problems, and not on the state. These processes are facilitated by a low level of social protection in cases of social risks in the form of loss of health, work, housing;

- *concentration of monetary savings of citizens on "hands", and not placing them in the banking system, where they could become a source of investment resources for the development of the national economy;*
- *people going to rallies to defend the position that the authorities, including local ones, in the conditions of war spend funds on measures to ensure victory in the war, and not on those areas where you can use part of the allocated funds for your personal interests.*

Inconsistency in fulfilling its promises on the part of the state significantly undermines trust in the authorities. Thus, the presence of two subsistence minimums, one of which is used to calculate minimum pensions, social benefits, measure the poverty level, and the other - to show how much the approved social standards do not correspond to real actual prices and the structure of consumption [9]. The presence of a mismatch between what is recorded in the laws and what is in practice, in particular, free education and medicine are legally enshrined in law, but in practice it is mostly out-of-pocket costs. And there are quite a lot of such gaps and inconsistencies:

- ❖ constant declarative fight against poverty....,
- ❖ devaluation of labor by the policy of cheap labor, including, and first of all, in the budget sector, when a working person cannot protect himself from poverty with his labor income (in 2021, there were 42.3% of such people) [10],
- ❖ this is the government's tacit consent to millions in salaries for members of the Supervisory Boards of state-owned enterprises, which is 300 times higher than the minimum wage, on which at least 40% of working people live,
- ❖ destroys trust in the authorities and non-fulfillment of the provision that Ukraine is a state governed by the rule of law, when there are people with money who are equal to others...

Such a striking difference destroys trust in the institution of the "state", and without trust, attitudes develop in society, when everyone is for himself, "my house is from the edge" and the shadow sector develops.

Today, researchers draw certain parallels regarding the situation of mass flight of people due to war and the protection policy instruments of European countries in this regard in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Former Yugoslavia, events of 1991-1995) and in modern Ukraine.

It was determined that the war in Yugoslavia led to the forced internal and external displacement of 3.2 million people; at the end of the war, only 42% of residents remained in their usual places of residence; 42% of the housing stock was destroyed; in 1992-1995, 700,000 refugees from BiH arrived in European countries [11].

The domestic researcher in the field of migration, Malinovska O., who in her research studied the experience of the former Yugoslavia in the return of refugees, analyzed the efforts of both the countries of origin and host countries to return refugees back. The General Return Commission was created, a return program was developed and approved in 1998, which included: funds for the restoration of destroyed housing for returning citizens; loans for starting your own business; humanitarian and financial assistance for current needs, medical services, social assistance; familiarization visits of exiles to their former residences, communication with community representatives, and local authorities were organized. Assistance was provided directly by the countries that provided asylum: programs were introduced in preparation for relocation, providing assistance for reintegration; countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, in order to encourage the return of refugees, paid returnees sum equivalent to or greater than the then average family income in Bosnia and Herzegovina [11, p.61-62.].

Some countries (Austria, Denmark, France, the Netherlands) introduced integration programs for refugees from Yugoslavia, as a result of which refugees could find employment and reach a level of self-sufficiency within a few years; which gave them the right to change temporary protection to permanent. Thus, the number of refugees remaining in the country in 2005 compared to 1992-1995 was as follows: Germany – 6.8%, Austria – 82%, Sweden – 95%, Switzerland – 44%, Turkey – 1%, the Netherlands – 72%, the USA – 87%, Canada – 92%; Denmark – 90%; Italy – 67%; Australia – 95%; Norway – 68% [11, p. 63.].

As a result of the efforts of international partners at the legislative and financial levels

(international aid for 1996-2004 was 200% of BiH's GDP in 1996), and the existence of divergent interests of countries (which applied a policy of promoting the departure of refugees or one that promoted the integration of refugees), led to the fact that only a third of those who left during the war returned to the Balkan countries [12].

Malinovska O. notes that the country has only partially succeeded in the policy of repatriation, under which the migrant successfully reintegrates into society, has an appropriate level of well-being and does not resort to re-migration. This was influenced by the fact that the impulse to return in most cases was the desire to receive compensation for lost and destroyed housing, which people received against the background of socio-economic problems in the country and difficulties with employment (the unemployment rate among the able-bodied was 30-40%), they left again. In addition, the presence of relatives abroad and the presence of residence documents were factors that facilitated the repeated departure.

Therefore, scientists express concern and certain disappointing forecasts regarding the return of Ukrainian refugees after the end of the war. Thus, Libanova E. notes that in the most optimistic case, half of those who went abroad will return to Ukraine. And the longer the war lasts, the less likely it is that people will return from their host countries to Ukraine [13].

Conclusions. Therefore, when forming the state policy of re-emigration, if it is to be singled out as a type of state policy, many aspects must be taken into account, the main of which is that re-emigrants should not be given any preferences over the local population and the socio-economic development of Ukraine. In particular, we note the following:

- refugees returning from abroad do not need to be united and singled out into a separate group, and separate, most attractive conditions should be created. We consider E. Libanova's opinion correct that decent living conditions should be ensured for everyone who will live in Ukraine, and not only for those who returned from abroad [13]; social rejection of this group may increase among the local population if additional preferences are introduced for them;
- some of those abroad, as well as some of the internally displaced persons, have/had real estate that was either damaged or destroyed. To solve this problem, it is necessary to introduce social housing provision programs (upon appropriate request from these categories of the population) and financial compensation programs for compensation of lost property. Social housing can be applied for by any person who does not have the means to rent housing on his own;
- adoption of relevant regulatory and legal documents to help re-emigrants with lost/damaged documents, recognition of documents for education obtained abroad, both formal and informal (at workplaces); enrollment of work experience abroad.

The above are additional return bonuses, but they play only a secondary role in the decision to return. The determining factor that will attract people to return to live in Ukraine is its development. People in Ukraine have the right to live and earn a decent living by their own work, and this requires real social standards, real support for the poor and those who are in a difficult situation; jobs with decent wages are needed; wages in Ukraine should be competitive with those of other European countries.

For this, Ukraine must become a legal and social state not declaratively, but in reality. This requires a transparent system of public administration aimed at the general welfare; directing efforts to the development of those industries that should become locomotives of our country's development - the IT sphere, construction, health care, renewable energy, agriculture, military industry, etc.

The return of people to Ukraine should not be an end in itself, but should be a consequence and witness to the birth and development of a new Ukraine.

Conflict of interests. The authors confirm that they are the authors of this work and have approved it for publication. The authors also certify that the obtained clinical data and research were conducted in compliance with the requirements of moral and ethical principles based on medical and pharmaceutical law, and in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be interpreted as a potential conflict of interest.

Funding. The authors state that this research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

References.

1. On the protection of the interests of subjects submitting reports and other documents during the period of martial law or a state of war: Law of Ukraine dated March 3, 2022 No. 2115-IX. *Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine*. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2115-20#Text>
2. Ukraine Refugee Situation. *United Nations High Commission for Refugees*. URL: <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>
3. Displacement Patterns, protection risks and needs of refugees from Ukraine. Regional Protection Analysis No. 3. Trends analysis Moldova, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. UNHCR Regional Bureau for Europe. *United Nations High Commission for Refugees*. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>
4. Herbert Brucker, Ette Andreas, Grabka M. Narkus. Ukrainian Refugees in Germany: Evidence From a Large Representative Survey https://www.bib.bund.de/Publikation/2023/pdf/Ukrainian-Refugees-in-Germany-Evidence-from-a-Large-Representative-Survey.pdf?_blob=publicationFile&v=2
5. Report on the statistics of returns of Ukrainians. Representation of IOM in Ukraine. Round 14 October 2023. <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/ukraina-zvit-pro-povernennya-v-ukraini-opituvannya-zagalnogo-naselennya-14-3-25-veresnya?close=true>
6. Linnyk O., Georgiivskiy Yu. State policy of re-emigration of Ukrainian refugees: conceptual principles of formation and implementation. URL: <http://www.baltijapublishing.lv/omp/index.php/bp/catalog/download/399/10832/22585-1?inline=1>
7. Hayuduky A.P. Socio-economic mechanisms of return of Ukrainian migrants and diaspora to Ukraine. Investments: practice and experience. 2023. No. 9. P.22-27. <https://dSPACE.chmnu.edu.ua/jspui/bitstream/123456789/1342/1/2023.%20-%20E2%84%96%209.pdf#page=23>
8. Index of Economic Freedom. 2023. *The Heritage Foundation*. URL: <https://www.heritage.org/index/ranking>
9. Yurkiv Yu. Living wage in Ukraine: poverty or a decent standard of living? *Ukrainian Pravda*. November 6, 2023. <https://www.epravda.com.ua/columns/2023/11/6/706251/>
10. The situation with poverty is not expected to improve in 2021. *TSN*. <https://tsn.ua/groshi/nazvano-kilkist-ukrayinciv-yaki-pracyuyut-ale-zhivut-u-bidnosti-1760974.html>
11. Malinovska O. How temporary is temporary protection: examples of forced migrants from the former Yugoslavia. *Demography and social economy*. 2023, No. 1 (51). P. 53-71. <https://ojs.dse.org.ua/index.php/dse/issue/view/13/24>
12. Libanova E. If we lose the war, Ukraine will turn into a total Buch. The facts. 30.01.2024. <https://fakty.ua/432625-esli-my-vojnu-proigraem-ukraina-prevratitsya-v-totalnuyu-buchu---ella-libanova>
13. Libanova E. There will be depopulation in Ukraine. There will not be 40 million of us and even more so there will not be 52. *LB.ua*. https://lb.ua/society/2024/01/26/595542_ukraini_bude_depopulyatsiya.html